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Climate Policy in the United States and Japan: Prospects in 2005  
and Beyond, Workshop Summary  
William A. Pizer and Kentaro Tamura  
Abstract  
Resources for the Future and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies 
convened a one and one-half day workshop on domestic and international climate policy May 
11–12, 2005, in Tokyo, Japan. The first day included 49 participants hearing presentations from 
13 speakers and discussing domestic activities, economics, and politics. The second day 
included a smaller group of participants listening to a panel of four experts and discussing 
opportunities for future international climate regimes. Participants included government 
officials from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment; the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; the U.S. Department of State; 
and the Massachusetts Department of Commonwealth Development; representatives from 
business and environmental groups; and academic experts. Over the course of both days, it was 
clear that great opportunities exist for regularly informing experts from both countries on recent 
policy developments, economic analyses, and political nuances in the other country. For 
example, U.S. participants had an opportunity to learn the process through which Japanese 
technology standards are set and implemented, the subtle evolution of mandatory policy 
discussions, and details of current policies on voluntary trading and an emission registry. 
Japanese participants benefited from a frank discussion with U.S. experts of how and why it 
would be difficult to link different domestic emissions trading markets, the current process to 
establish a regional emissions trading program, and the evolving dynamics in the U.S. Senate.   
Looking forward, important lessons may be taken from past negotiating experiences. A 
small group of national leaders, including large emitters of greenhouse gases and major 
economies, addressing not only climate change but also developmental issues, could be a useful 
vehicle for meaningful international efforts. Such a small-group process should be carried out in 
parallel with the multilateral United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. 
In addition, policies in both the United States and Japan reflect a strong emphasis on technology 
development and commercialization; this may be an area where bilateral cooperation could be 
particularly beneficial.  
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 Climate Policy in the United States and Japan: Prospects in 2005 
and Beyond, Workshop Summary 
William A. Pizer and Kentaro Tamura∗ 
Introduction 
 Climate change is the one of the most serious and urgent challenges for human beings. 
Responses to this challenge are occurring at all levels of society. Businesses and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); local, regional, national, and federal agencies; 
legislatures; and numerous international policy fora are contemplating mitigation, technology, 
and adaptation strategies. Keeping abreast of these developments in one’s own country, let alone 
in other industrialized and developing countries around the world, is increasingly difficult if not 
impossible. However, the interrelatedness of these developments—in terms of learning from 
others’ experience, synchronizing and cooperating on domestic efforts, improving international 
efficiency and, ideally, linking these policies through common measures and mechanisms—
makes such awareness essential. As the first and second biggest economies in the world, the 
United States and Japan are in a position of unique responsibility for tackling global climate 
change and have been deeply involved in climate initiatives. Given their long shared history, 
significant trade relations, and common interests in technological development, the opportunity 
for and importance of cooperation is that much greater.   
Since 2001, however, the two countries have been addressing the problems in different 
ways. While Japan ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the United States has withdrawn from the 
protocol. After its withdrawal, the U.S. government launched a series of international initiatives 
in technology research, development, and deployment. At the same time, various actions to 
address climate change have been taken at different levels of governance in the United States. 
These include state- and local-level governmental activities as well as shareholders’ resolutions 
and nongovernmental policy commissions in the private sector, some of which are truly 
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innovative and warrant attention. On the other hand, in Japan, after the entry into force of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the Japanese Cabinet has just approved the Kyoto Target Achievement Plan, 
requiring additional policy measures to meet the Kyoto target. Japanese experiences in making 
such policies as well as in improving energy efficiency are also worth sharing with U.S. 
stakeholders. Climate change policies and politics are evolving rapidly in both the United States 
and Japan, with significant repercussions for both trade and international relations. As the two 
countries continue to address climate change issues in different ways, it is increasingly important 
for experts in each country to follow activities in the other country.  
In addition, a better understanding about the domestic climate policies of each country 
will constructively provide insight into the design of future international climate regimes. The 
United States is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and has one of the most dynamic 
and innovative markets in the world. Therefore, its engagement is critical to the success of any 
international effort against global climate change in the long run. One of the important lessons 
learned from its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol is that the United States needs to forge domestic 
consensus on climate policy before it aggressively engages international efforts. Stakeholders 
and policymakers in Japan, who have a keen interest in understanding—and perhaps 
influencing—the return of the United States to international activism on climate change, want to 
know what is actually going on in the United States in order to create an international regime 
conducive to future U.S. participation. Meanwhile, stakeholders and policymakers in the United 
States want to know whether, and to what extent, real action is occurring in key industrialized 
countries. Such concern is at the heart of the 1997 Byrd–Hagel resolution expressing conditions 
for U.S. participation in an international regime. (As a domestic policy interest, U.S. 
stakeholders are also interested in how Japan’s high degree of energy efficiency was achieved 
and how it might be encouraged in the United States.) Both countries clearly have an interest in 
understanding what is actually occurring on the ground in the other country beyond the official 
rhetoric. Policymakers in both countries are interested in furthering cooperation where possible 
in order to avoid having climate change policy become even more divisive.  
Against this backdrop of divisiveness yet curious mutual interest, Resources for the 
Future (RFF) and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) organized a second 
workshop on U.S. and Japanese climate policy in Tokyo in May 2005 following a highly  
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successful initial workshop in Washington in February 2004.1 A dozen U.S. participants from 
government, academia, business, and stakeholder groups came for one and one-half days of 
discussions with a larger group of their Japanese counterparts. The workshop had three main 
goals: 
●  First, the workshop sought to educate participants about on-the-ground developments 
in each country. Experts from government, academia, business, and NGOs in both 
countries gave detailed presentations of proposals, analyses, actions, and likely 
outcomes.  
●  Second, the workshop sought to elicit ideas for improving policies in each country. 
Each panel included ample time for questions, answers, and discussion. Participants 
debated, for example, whether U.S. climate technology policy is really sustainable, given 
its multi-billion dollar annual cost and current budget deficits, as well as different 
perspectives on widely acclaimed voluntary programs initiated by Japanese industry. 
●  Finally, the workshop sought ideas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. A key 
point was that a small group of large emitters and major economies addressing not only 
climate change but also developmental issues could be a useful vehicle for meaningful 
international efforts alongside a continued parallel, multilateral United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. A second point was that 
sharing—or at least coordinating—incentives and resources for technology development 
and commercialization may be an area of beneficial international cooperation in the near 
term. 
In the remainder of this workshop summary, we highlight the presentations and 
discussions from each session, particularly the international policy discussion, and attempt to 
draw some useful conclusions. The agenda and participant list are attached as an appendix; 
presentations are available from the RFF website (http://www.rff.org). 
                                                 
1 See Pizer, William, and Kentaro Tamura. 2004. Climate Policy in the U.S. and Japan, Workshop Summary 2004. 
RFF Discussion Paper 04-22.  
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Summary of Sessions 
The workshop was divided into five sessions: domestic climate policy update, bridging 
stakeholder differences, encouraging technology development and diffusion, lessons from past 
experiences, and a panel discussion on international policy. The three sessions on domestic 
policy consisted of two or three presentations on the U.S. side and two presentations on the 
Japanese side, followed by a moderated discussion. The domestic policy sessions included 49 
participants. The fourth session, on international policy, involved four presentations (two 
Japanese and two American), followed by the fifth session of a moderated discussion. The 
international policy sessions were smaller by design. 
Session I: Domestic Climate Policy Update 
The aim of the first session was to inform participants of the latest policy developments 
in the two countries. The discussion began with presentations by Osamu Mizuno, Ministry of the 
Environment, and Takao Aiba, Development Bank of Japan, on Japanese policy. Mizuno 
discussed both the process and progress for making climate policy in Japan, including an outline 
of the Kyoto Target Achievement Plan approved by the Japanese Cabinet on April 28, 2005. 
While the projected GHG emissions level of 2010 under the current policy program will be 6% 
higher than the base year, the Kyoto Target Achievement Plan includes additional domestic 
policies and measures to reduce the emissions level by 6.5%. Mizuno highlighted three elements 
of Japan’s new policy: 1) a mandatory GHG accounting and reporting system, which requests 
large emitters to report their GHG emissions to administrative bodies; 2) a voluntary emission 
trading scheme, which was launched in May 2005; and 3) an upfront payment system for Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation Mechanism (CDM/JI) projects. He also 
emphasized the on-going debate in the government on carbon tax, including recent proposals for 
a ¥2500–3000 tax per ton of carbon that have not gone forward.  
Aiba presented the outline of the Japan GHG Reduction Fund (JGRF) and Japan Carbon 
Finance, Ltd. (JCF). The Development Bank of Japan and the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation established JGRF/JCF in December 2004 with 31 private firms contributing 
US$ 141.5 million. The purpose of the JGRF/JCF is to purchase Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from CDM/JI projects issued for the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol on behalf of contributing firms. Japan faces the 
highest cost of GHG emissions abatement in the world, making credit acquisition from overseas 
emissions reduction projects through CDM/JI critical for Japan to achieve the Kyoto target cost- 
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effectively. However, large GHG emitters, like utilities, are unfamiliar with investment in 
developing countries, and institutional uncertainty regarding CDM/JI has created fears that 
privately acquired credits could be confiscated by the government. Against this background, the 
JCF and the JGRF were founded as the two main components of a government-backed credit 
purchase scheme (credit buyer and fund pool, respectively).  
Joseph Kruger of RFF, Andrew Gottlieb of the Massachusetts Office of Commonwealth 
Development, and William (Billy) Pizer of the National Commission of Energy Policy continued 
the session with discussions of U.S. policy. Kruger discussed recent activities in Congress, 
especially the Energy Bill. He also discussed various provisions for emissions registry and 
reporting under alternate legislative proposals. Such provisions would arguably lead to a scheme 
to create transferable credit for voluntary reductions and provide hedging opportunity for 
businesses facing adverse consequences under a future climate policy, thereby encouraging 
reductions now. He noted that there are few prospects for legislating such provisions in the 
current Congress.  
Gottlieb explained the current status of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
an effort by nine northeastern states to establish a regional emissions trading program. In total, 
GHG emissions from the nine states of RGGI amount to 14% of U.S. GHG emissions and 3.2%  
of world GHG emissions (roughly equal to those from Germany). In designing the program, key 
issues included the determinations of model reference case (base case) and cap levels and offsets 
outside the region (reductions from external sources). Finally, Pizer summarized the climate and 
technology portions of the recent report by the National Commission on Energy Policy, 
particularly their proposal for a mandatory, economy-wide, emissions trading program with a 
“safety valve.” The report recommends that the trading system should begin in 2010. The system 
would set the GHG intensity target of 2.4% annual reductions. The safety valve price would be 
initially set at $7 per metric ton of CO2-equvalent and increase by 5% each year. Subsequent U.S. 
action, including continued increases in the safety valve price, would be linked with comparable 
efforts by other developed and developing countries via a program review in 2015 and every five 
years thereafter.  
These presentations were followed by 90 minutes of questions and answers about the 
current policy landscape in both countries. On the Japanese side, there was considerable 
discussion about the proposed voluntary trading program. Currently, 30 to 35 companies have  
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submitted proposals, including a pledge of quantified reductions and a requested subsidy. The 
plan is for the government to accept roughly 30 bids, for trading to occur in 2006, and for 
compliance verification in 2007.2 Unlike the U.K. trading scheme, there is no tax exemption to 
motivate participation in the program. There was also a brief discussion of the Japanese registry, 
which will cover all sources above roughly 3,000 tons or about 50% of Japanese emissions. 
Questions were also asked about whether the taxes discussed by the government would have 
been up- or downstream; except for gasoline/kerosene, the discussions focused downstream. The 
Japanese side also clarified that as part of their efforts to switch to more carbon-friendly fuels, 
completion of the three nuclear plants that was temporally suspended due to accidents is 
expected in the next few years. 
On the U.S. side, discussions centered, in part, on the RGGI program. Competitiveness 
was discussed, recognizing that there are 10–15 utilities participating and 100-plus sources. It 
was also pointed out that if the RGGI program only succeeds in raising electricity prices in the 
region and driving generation to other parts of the country it will not be considered a success. 
The program needs to be set up so that it does not encourage significant leakage, which is a real 
problem in a regional program. Questions were raised about whether RGGI would consider 
credits from other countries. This lead to a discussion of the additionality trade-off: seeking the 
cheapest reductions anywhere versus asking states to make reductions within their borders. 
Concerns were also raised about whether state governments could really guarantee the quality of 
reductions achieved beyond their borders, as well as state authority to be involved in 
international markets. (Similar concerns over overseas offsets under the McCain–Lieberman bill 
led to a 15% cap on offset credits in that proposal.) On the plus side, it was noted that 
international trading by states could build more momentum for a federal program. Finally, a 
question was raised about whether windfall profits might accrue to some generators under the 
RGGI program; it was pointed out that rewarding clean generators is not necessarily a bad thing. 
At one point, the similarity between U.S. and Japanese domestic programs was pointed 
out: reliance on voluntary programs and a fear of taxes. It was pointed out that two committees 
of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party—Environment and Agriculture (whose stakeholders stood 
to benefit from some of the carbon tax revenues)—supported the carbon tax proposal. The 
Commerce Committee was against it; the Transport Committee is currently against it but open 
                                                 
2 On May 17, 2005, the Ministry of the Environment announced that the number of participating companies was 34.   
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for the future. On the U.S. side, in response to a question about why we (states, some in 
Congress, academics) continue to focus on trading despite clear opposition, it was pointed out 
that: a) taxes are not a great alternative because people do not trust government with the 
revenue—even though carbon taxes were and continue to be supported by some stakeholders;3 
and b) the trend is toward market-based approaches and away from command-and-control style 
regulation—even though there are some notable exceptions, like proposed motor vehicle 
standards in California. 
Toward the end of the first session, there was a discussion about tackling transportation 
emissions. The Japanese have a three-part approach: fuel economy improvements, improving 
traffic flow, and improving freight movements. On fuel economy, the Japanese have achieved a 
22.5% improvement in 2005 relative to 1990—this represents voluntary achievement of a 2010 
standard five years early. On the last two, frustration was expressed that efforts and achievement 
in these areas is difficult to quantify, leaving fuel economy to bear a greater burden. 
Session II: Bridging Stakeholder Differences 
This session involved presentations by Masayuki Sasanouchi (Toyota Motor 
Corporation) and Kevin Fay (International Climate Change Partnership) on the Japanese and U.S. 
business perspectives, followed by Yurika Ayukawa (World Wildlife Federation Japan) and 
Vicki Arroyo (Pew Center on Global Climate Change) on Japanese and U.S. NGOs’ views. 
Sasanouchi summarized the essence of voluntary action by business, using examples from the 
automotive industry. He pointed to the manufacturers’ voluntary achievement of fuel economy 
standards (more than 15.1 km per liter) in 2003, well prior to the target year of 2010, as an 
example of success in self-regulation. He also noted the necessity of pursuing a parallel approach 
to technology development to hedge technological uncertainty as well as to meet diversified 
consumers’ tastes. In addition, Sasanouchi cast doubt on numerical reduction targets and 
proposed a sector-based benchmarking approach. The presentation by Fay included a series of 
U.S. business perspectives and concerns regarding current and future climate policy. An 
interesting point was that current mixed messages to industry from the administration—that 
climate change is a serious problem but little tangible guidance about when and how various 
                                                 
3 Several U.S. participants pointed to the recent statement by Duke Energy (a regional power producer in the 
southeastern United States) in favor of a carbon tax.  
  8
solutions are expected/desired—would be unlikely to produce enough voluntary action or spur a 
technology revolution.  
Ayukawa expressed the NGO perspective on Japanese climate policy. She presented the 
outline of the WWF Japan’s proposal for a mandatory domestic emission trading system for 
large emitters and proposed a policy mix of emission trading and carbon tax. She also claimed 
that Japan should adopt a long-term target, such as keeping temperature rise below 2°C by 2100, 
and then provide plans on what we need to do to achieve that target by 2050, by 2030, and now. 
This long-term target will make people understand better where we are heading for and actions 
needed now to get there. Finally, Arroyo explained the role of U.S. NGOs in domestic climate 
policymaking and differentiated NGOs in terms of their policy stances. 
An interesting point made by two presenters—on both the NGO and business side—was 
the need for long-term goals. Further discussion elaborated that from the business perspective it 
is important to know where policies are headed in concrete terms. The goal need not be a 
concentration or temperature goal but should be something that helps businesses make better 
decisions. This is in contrast to the NGO perspective, where the goal is viewed as something to 
highlight environmental concerns—such as a warming limit of 2°C—and to help envision a 
structural reform of society in which there will be less threat of global warming. There was more 
push back on the business side, with questions raised about whether such long-term goals really 
influence business decisions versus the need to define real metrics for success. While 
recognizing the importance of such long-term goals for policymakers, one participant also raised 
a question about whether the long-term goals, which are not broken down by sectors or 
companies, can really change the investment decisions of the private sector. The discussion 
emphasized that it was really a matter of balance—something longer-term than a five-year 
emission target, on one hand, but shorter-term than a 2100 concentration goal. A closing 
comment on this topic emphasized that any such goal needed to balance environmental and 
economic concerns; just focusing on environment is irresponsible. 
The discussion of long-term goals led to the discussion of sectoral performance standards 
as an alternative to or supplement for Kyoto-style targets. U.S. businesses do not like this 
approach if it looks like regulation, but on the other hand, it was pointed out that opposition to 
negotiated, economy-wide emission limits could push the regime in that direction. Arguably, 
some combination of broad incentives, regulatory frameworks, and sectoral programs is likely 
necessary to combat such a complex problem.   
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This session also included a brief discussion of U.S. business concerns about possible 
trade sanctions or barriers by Kyoto participants (including imposition of an energy-equalization 
tax or carbon levy) against non-participants. It was pointed out that some U.S. businesses are 
concerned about such practices but such things always seem unlikely until they happen and that 
provisions for such actions existed in the Montreal Protocol.  
A question was also asked about whether there were any “poison pills” for U.S. climate 
policy from a U.S. NGO perspective. For example, would provisions for nuclear, clean coal, or a 
safety valve make any proposal unacceptable to the environmental community in the United 
States? The response was that any practical NGO needed to realize that society needs either coal 
or nuclear, if not both, to solve the climate change problem in the long run. The sense was that at 
the end of the day, NGOs would not block a deal because of a safety valve, although there is a 
question of whether there is a threshold price below which they might balk. It was also pointed 
out that while at one point NGOs would have supported technology programs (including the 
current proposal by Senator Hagel) or a registry, now those efforts are seen as giving away votes 
for a real policy, making such policies less popular with NGOs. 
Session III: Encouraging Technology Development and Diffusion 
The presentations and discussion in this session focused upon the issues related to 
technology development and diffusion. Toshiyuki Sakamoto of the Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry, and Mark Heil of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
presented climate change-related technology policies in Japan and the United States, respectively. 
Masahiko Kaneko (West Japan Engineering Consultants) explained several issues related to 
renewable energy technology transfers. Jae Edmonds (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) 
discussed the design of technology policy.   
Explaining Japanese technology policy, Sakamoto emphasized the importance of both 
“government push” and “market pull,” along with voluntary action by business. He also pointed 
out that despite the huge potential of CO2 emission reduction by energy conservation in 
developing countries, the current CDM has failed to realize this potential. He suggested that 
CDM should be reformed to provide incentives for developing countries to promote conservation 
and renewable energy more effectively. Heil’s presentation summarized the progress of the U.S. 
multilateral and bilateral technology initiatives. He also provided case studies of a Climate 
Technology Partnership program with South Korea.   
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Kaneko provided a practitioner’s view on the development and deployment of renewable 
energy technology with special reference to geothermal development in Indonesia. He pointed 
out two main barriers—initial investment burden and resource development risks—and 
suggested that appropriate policies by local and host governments and technology transfer could 
help to overcome such barriers. Edmonds provided a study of long-term emissions scenarios and 
what kind of institutional architecture would be necessary to reach a certain level of GHG 
atmospheric concentration.  
An important discussion on this panel was whether climate technology policy is 
sustainable given its multi-billion dollar annual cost and current budget deficits. Responses 
included: a) that these are small compared to Kyoto costs; b) that part of technology policy is 
prioritization and re-programming; c) funding at least at current levels has been constant, and d) 
that the Energy Bill could be a vehicle for seeking more funds, especially for deployment.  
This panel also led to a discussion of CDM reform—something picked up on the second 
day. 
One question that was asked is why voluntary programs, especially technology 
deployment, are successful in Japan. It stems in part from active government involvement; the 
government reviews progress each year by all 34 sub-sectors. Businesses also have flexibility in 
designing their targets in terms of one of four metrics: absolute energy consumption, absolute 
emissions, emissions intensity, or energy intensity. In the end, public data are submitted and the 
process of reviewing the efforts is quite transparent to the public. Therefore, public shame is a 
significant threat. Moreover, CEOs consider their goals as commitments to the society. Both the 
Japanese government and public successfully put pressure on the keidanren (a Japanese business 
association that coordinates these voluntary policies). There is a good dialogue between business 
and government, and there is almost a competition among companies to exceed environmental 
standards and receive favorable public recognition.  
Another question was asked regarded the financing of carbon capture and storage. Two 
financial issues involved in carbon sequestration were pointed out. The first is the necessity of 
carbon price. Unless CO2 mitigation has value, either explicitly or implicitly, there is little reason 
to invest in capture and sequestration technology. The second is the financial liability of carbon 
leakage. CO2 needs to be stored for an indefinite period (hundreds if not thousands of years) and 
there are real risks that sequestered CO2 will leak. If investors become liable for long-term, 
perhaps unknowable, leakage risks, those risks become a disincentive to invest.  
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Sessions IV and V: Multilateral International Climate Policy 
The international policy discussion began with initial comments by four speakers from 
both the United States and Japan, followed by an open discussion for two hours. Rafe Pomerance 
(Climate Policy Center), Hironori Hamanaka (Keio University/IGES), Ray Kopp (RFF), and 
Kotaro Kimura (Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute) presented their own 
views on future climate regimes. 
Pomerance pointed out the significant differences between climate change and other 
international environmental problems and related areas of negotiation. In particular, climate 
change is more complex, more uncertain, more long-lived, and fundamentally more connected to 
economic growth and vested interests than most other issues. A key problem with the Kyoto 
Protocol is that it attempted to lead domestic action with international negotiations—whereas the 
reverse is a more practical model. Pomerance concluded with the need to emphasize domestic 
policies, long-term commitment (e.g., R&D investment), and practical, short-term efforts that 
create useful long-term structures. Hamanaka’s presentation complemented Pomerance’s by 
emphasizing the need for both “push” and “pull” long-term technology efforts. He highlighted 
the likely need for a variety of mechanisms to successfully push and pull new technologies: 
economic incentives, more traditional regulation, and voluntary initiatives.  
Both Kopp and Kimura emphasized the potential usefulness of a parallel negotiating 
track involving a subset of UNFCCC signatories—particularly major emitters and economic 
powers, including developing as well as industrialized countries. Kopp also emphasized the need 
to pursue climate change in the context of a larger package of issues, including trade, 
development, and technology transfer. This is necessary to provide more dimensions for 
compromise as well as to alleviate developing countries’ fear of climate change becoming a 
vehicle for curbing their development aspirations. Kimura discussed the potential for bottom-up, 
sectoral policies if top-down approaches falter, as well as the need to balance resources between 
mitigation and adaptation. 
The general discussion of international regimes began with interest in potential 
technology “pull” policies in developing countries, somehow accommodating developing 
country interest in growth and industrialized interest in mitigation. That is, development policy 
needs to be crafted in a way that embraces environmental goals, with industrialized countries 
providing considerable support. In response to the suggestion to broaden negotiations to include 
trade and development, it was pointed out that stakeholders in the trade debate (or at least 
economists in that debate) often seek to keep it pure: They seek free trade for trade’s sake and do  
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not like complicating the otherwise simple notion of unfettered trade with side agreements. On 
the other hand, it was pointed out that such issue bartering underlies the European Union support 
of Russian entry into the World Trade Organization. The potential to broaden climate policy 
discussions among developing countries will soon be tested by efforts, led in part by Japan, to 
reform the CDM to necessarily emphasize engagement in more activities versus strict 
environmental certainty. 
The bottom line, participants noted, is that cash speaks louder than anything else and that 
when industrialized countries are willing to put money on the table to encourage real developing 
country action, action will happen. The devil, of course, is in the details: how exactly to structure 
such incentives. Rising carbon prices in industrialized countries coupled with developing country 
offset programs are certainly one route. Another idea is a donor’s conference focused on 
encouraging carbon-friendly economic development. It was pointed out that the Montreal 
Protocol created roughly $1 billion for such support in the phase-out of ozone-depleting potential 
(ODPs) substances. 
There was significant interest among the participants in potentially linking emerging 
domestic emissions trading markets. However, the views expressed by the participants, 
particularly those from the United States, were not so optimistic. Such linkage implies equalizing 
marginal costs among countries along with corresponding wealth transfers—transfers that may 
be problematic politically. Different countries also appear to have different ideas on what level 
the carbon prices should be (e.g., the European Union is interested in high prices to stimulate 
technology innovation, while others prefer lower prices in conjunction with more direct 
technology policy). While global trading is more efficient in terms of making all nations as a 
whole better off, it may lead to distributional impacts within nations that are undesirable. Based 
on these concerns, the linkage of systems with significantly different autarkic prices may not be 
desirable. These concerns exist in addition to technical issues, including different rules for 
offsets, possible “safety valve” prices, and measuring and monitoring requirements.  
An unanswered question was the potential role for export banks, that is, a carbon 
portfolio standard for export bank loans. 
There was a lengthy discussion about the potential for, and inherent difficulties of, 
lifestyle changes for both mitigation and adaptation. Both U.S. and Japanese publics seem to like 
their current lifestyles. Recycling was cited as the one of the few successful campaigns to change 
lifestyles in both countries. (Changing U.S. behavior with respect to smoking was also identified,  
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but arguably smoking consequences accrue primarily to the smoker compared to recycling or 
climate change mitigation, where the benefits generally accrue to society).  
The need to balance mitigation and adaptation, as well as the potential for adaptation 
efforts to draw attention to the need for mitigation, was noted. It was also noted that the United 
States is a great responder to crisis, but not such a great predictor of, or preparer for, crisis. The 
largest single U.S. expenditure on climate change in the near future is likely to be adaptation: 
More than $300 million will likely be spent on relocating Alaskan communities threatened by 
changing climate conditions. 
Participants discussed various reforms to the CDM, particularly shifting away from a 
focus on additionality and ton-for-ton accounting and toward an emphasis on channeling climate-
friendly funds to developing countries. While the current focus is understandable, practical 
interest in a more flexible approach and longer-term institution building—versus short-term 
reductions—could encourage this evolution. The end result need not be overly restrictive nor 
unduly generous; a focus on transparent, performance and/or multi-project standards was 
suggested. Use of investment and private sector experts, rather than climate policy experts, was 
suggested as a way to expedite review—an enforceable limit on the maximum time for review is 
another. Finally, it was noted that CDM projects should not be used as or viewed primarily as a 
route to lowering program costs—that is most effectively achieved via a safety valve mechanism. 
The CDM should be a vehicle for encouraging climate-friendly activities in developing 
countries.  
The discussion of international regimes ended with support voiced for a more flexible 
pledge and review approach, as well as for a smaller, parallel negotiation effort among nations 
that include major emitters and economic powers. It was emphasized that this effort must be 
carried out in parallel with the multilateral UNFCCC process, which is important in terms of 
normative developments and representing developing countries that are most vulnerable to the 
negative impact of climate change.  
Conclusion 
In his summarizing comments on the first day, Richard Morgenstern (RFF), returned to 
the question of similarities and differences among Japanese and U.S. polices. On the one hand, 
both currently have a focus on voluntary programs and technology. On the other hand, closer 
scrutiny suggests that voluntary programs in Japan involve more coercive elements. Also, the 
United States has chosen not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and, unlike Japan, has not put any  
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money into international projects via CDM and JI mechanisms. The U.S. government has not 
attempted to subsidize a voluntary emissions trading program, as the Japanese government has 
chosen to do. There are also notable differences among stakeholders. Japanese businesses are 
more in harmony with the government, while in the United States there is a range of positions 
ranging from those who want to see more action to those who want to see less. Japanese NGOs 
are more focused on long-term, international goals, while U.S. NGOs are more focused on 
domestic action. In the technology arena, it is harder to find differences, with multiple, active 
programs in both countries (e.g., performance standards). Both the United States and Japan are 
reaching out for international cooperation, both face budget constraints, and both have sought 
creative accounting to document both effort and outcomes. Hironori Hamanaka (Keio 
University/IGES) concluded by noting there are many areas where mutual understanding can be 
enhanced, that the discussions have laid a good foundation, and that the future requires a better 
framework/regime to address climate change issues. 
On the second day, there was a rough consensus favoring reform of the CDM, a more 
flexible international process, and parallel negotiations among a smaller group of countries. 
As RFF and IGES plan to hold another workshop on climate policy in the United States 
and Japan in March 2006, participants provided comments and suggestions concerning topics for 
next year. These suggestions included:  
•  Continued updates on domestic policy developments in each country. The high level of 
specificity and detail in this workshop is particularly valuable. 
•  Continued emphasis on ideas for future regimes. There was a specific interest in focusing 
on Asian concerns at the next conference, building on a new IGES effort focusing on that 
region. Careful attention should be paid to developments at November’s COP 11/MOP 1 
meeting in Montreal. 
•  Attention to the long-run domestic policy outlook in the United States, beyond the current 
administration.  
•  Domestic policies within key sectors, such as electricity and transportation. This could 
also include a discussion of sector-based international frameworks. 
•  Non-federal activities in the United States, including nongovernmental and state-level 
developments. 
•  Long-term technology needs and pathways. 
•  Long-term objectives and goals, including a shift away from 1990 as a base year.  
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•  Use of a co-benefits approach to engage developing countries on the climate change issue 
in a way that meets the development need of those countries. 
•  Incorporating GHG pollution costs into carbon prices and sending the right signals to the 
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